Efficiency, Competition and Long Term Contracts in Electricity Markets
Florence, 15th - 16th January 2009
Organized by LARSEN & Loyola de Palacio Program of the European University Institute (Florence)
The first ever Loyola de Palacio Workshop at the European University Institute addressed in partnership with GIS LARSEN (Paris) the issue of long-term supply contracts in European decentralized electricity markets. Three sessions and two roundtables gathered over two days 42 experts to discuss current problems and possible solutions under the Chattam House rule. The first session discussed the contribution of long-term supply contracts to the fulfillment of different policy objectives such as long-term generation adequacy, security of supply and sustainably low prices for energy intensive industries. The second session addressed from a more academic perspective the effects of these contracts in an imperfectly competitive market setting and their relative strength and weaknesses as compared to vertical integration. The last session focused on the current action of national and community competition authorities vis-à-vis these contracts, both under state aid or the antitrust rules, and in comparison with the US jurisprudence.
